INTRODUCTION
The federal government's Railroad Retirement program is a unique institution. The program is a government program and its assets are government assets. At the same time, Railroad Retirement is the employer pension program of rail workers, who are largely private-sector workers and the program is funded by taxes paid solely by these workers and their employers.
The Railroad Retirement and Survivor's Improvement Act of 2001 (RRSIA) introduced four major reforms. It raised benefits, cut taxes, created the National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (NRRIT) to invest Railroad Retirement assets in equities and other private-sector securities, and it introduced an automatic tax adjustment mechanism to keep the program's finances on-track.
Changes in the Railroad Retirement program are typically initiated by the private-sector parties, in negotiations between rail management and labor. The industry then brings its proposals to Congress for enactment. 1 The 2001 reform largely enacted the proposals developed by rail management and labor with relatively few changes. Congress's primary concerns, and the major changes it introduced, were in the design of the Investment Trust. This assessment of the reformed Railroad Retirement program and its prospects going forward will thus begin with a review the design of the NRRIT and its governance of Railroad Retirement assets.
THE DESIGN OF THE NATIONAL RAILROAD INVESTMENT TRUST
Some leading Republican members of Congress and the Bush Administration fiercely opposed the creation of the NRRIT and the investment of "government" assets in equities and other private-sector securities. 2 The reason was the potential for political influence on investment decisions that would degrade investment performance and -much worse -distort the political process in favor of those who influenced these decisions. The record of state and local pension plans, and the plans of other nations, was full of examples of ssuch influence. 3 See Palacios (2002) ; Munnell and Sundén (1983) ; Sass (1992) ; and Brown, Pollet, and Weisbenner (2009) .
What made passions especially intense was the precedent the NRRIT would set for the reform of the nation's Social Security program. Social Security and its funding shortfall were then at the top of the nation's political agenda. The two leading proposals for reform both included investments in equities; but they included equities in very different ways. The
Democrats under President Clinton had proposed investing a portion of Social Security's $2 trillion Trust Fund in stocks. The Republicans under President Bush would allow workers to divert a portion of their Social Security payroll taxes to individual accounts, where the funds could be invested in stocks. The Democrats were confident they could eliminate political influence in the Trust Fund's investment decisions. The Republicans were just as confident they couldn't. And the specter of political influence over the Social Security Trust Fund -100 times larger than the Railroad Retirement Trust Fund -made the NRRIT and its investment of government assets in equities abhorrent to certain Republicans who were focused on the Social Security policy divide.
While Congress ultimately enacted reform, including the NRRIT, some influential Senators and Representatives were sympathetic to these concerns. Congress's overriding objective in revising the industry plan was thus to eliminate, as much as possible, the potential for political influence on investment decisions. As Railroad Retirement was the employer pension program of the railroad industry, Congress removed government from managing its assets. The industry had proposed a nine-person Board of Trustees, with three Trustees selected by the carriers, three by labor, and three by the Railroad Retirement Board. Congress removed the three Railroad Retirement Board representatives, as the Board was a government agency: the statute specifically stated that "no member of the Railroad Retirement Board shall be eligible to be a member of the Board of Trustees." The organizations representing labor and management, as specified in the Railway Labor Act, would select the six private-sector trustees. Then they, not the government, would select a single "independent" trustee.
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Congress also moved the NRRIT, and thereby Railroad Retirement assets, out of the government. The statute clearly stated that the entity created to hold and manage Railroad Retirement assets -the National Railroad Investment Trust -"is not a department, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of the United States." The entity was also named a "trust" "to more closely track the structure of private sector pension trusts and "make the investment aspects of the proposal sufficiently 'less governmental. '" 5 Private-sector pension trusts themselves had problems with "political influence" on investment Also borrowing from ERISA, Congress required competent investment management. It couldn't mandate "success." But it did require trustees with "professional" qualifications -with "experience and expertise in the management of financial investments and pension plans"; to invest Railroad Retirement assets with "care, skill, prudence, and diligence" -the ERISA "prudent man" standard; and to diversify asset holdings "so as to minimize risk of large losses"
and "avoid disproportionate influence over a particular industry or firm" -a potentially politically problematic influence. Trust was now ready -eight months after its creation -to manage the assets of the Railroad Retirement program.
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Consistent with the intent of Congress, the Trustees created added safeguards against "political" influences on investment decisions. ERISA allowed pension trusts to invest up to10 percent of their assets in the sponsor's securities. As the language in RSSIA seemed to frown on such investments, the Trustees agreed not to invest any Railroad Retirement assets in securities issued by North American railroads. The pension fund would not be seen as a "captive source of credit" for the industry, or any firm in the industry. The Trustees also decided to restrict active investment managers to oversee no more than 10 percent of Trust Fund assets. While the primary purpose was to promote diversification, the policy would also limit any perceived influence on the broader U.S. economy. Finally, the Trustees adopted institutional investor "best practice" for voting proxies. It delegated proxy voting to the Trust's external investment managers with the mandate that "all proxies shall be voted solely in the interest of plan participants and beneficiaries."
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The "politics" of the Board was also conducive to effective Trust Fund management.
Various Trustees report a high degree of comity, with essentially no disagreements between management and labor, and the Trustees making decisions in an efficient, business-like manner.
A contributing factor could be joint management-labor effort in winning Congressional approval of the 2001 reform. Another could be the distribution of risk. The carriers bore all the downside risk. The tax adjustment mechanism RSSIA introduced would raise the carriers' payroll tax, not the workers' payroll tax, if the finances of the program weakened beyond specified benchmarks. As the carriers were also far more willing and able than labor to bear that downside risk, this removed a potential area of conflict between management and labor Trustees.
Whatever the reason, the Board, by all reports, was generally united reaching its investment and managerial decisions.
PERFORMANCE OF THE TRUST TO DATE
The The interest rate decline that produced the capital gain on Railroad Retirement bonds and boosted the program's account benefits ratio -the yardstick used to measure the health of the program -had a very different effect on the "funded ratio" of private defined benefit pension plans -the yardstick used to measure the health of such plans. The funded ratio is the ratio of trust fund assets to the present value of plan obligations. It reports whether the plan has sufficient assets in-hand to meet those obligations. The obligations of a pension plan stretch far into the future and by statute must be valued using current interest rates on high quality corporate bonds. Just as the decline in interest rates raised the value of Treasuries held by the Railroad Retirement system, it raised the present value of private pension obligations. The interest rate decline was in fact the main contributor to the dramatic fall in the funded ratios of private plans in the early 2000s. Congress, concerned that plan sponsors and their plans could go bust and transfer large unfunded obligations to the government's Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, had over time required sponsors to rapidly eliminate shortfalls when the shortfalls grew beyond specified levels. These rules resulted in contributions tripling in the recession at the turn of the 0% 3% 6% 9% century and were a major factor in sponsor decisions to terminate, freeze, or otherwise abandon their defined-benefit pension programs.
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Government-run social insurance programs do not have the same bankruptcy risks as private defined benefit plans. Thus the funded ratio, which uses the present value of plan obligations as the yardstick for assessing the adequacy of pension plan assets, is far less useful for assessing the health of such programs. Railroad Retirement, however anomalous, is a government-run social insurance program. It might be argued that the interest rate decline should trigger a reduction in the expected return on Trust Fund assets, which could require an offsetting increase in Railroad Retirement payroll taxes. But no such relationship was present in RSSIA's tax adjustment "ratchet," which based payroll taxes solely on the ratio of assets to annual benefit payments.
Whatever the implications of the decline in interest rates on expected returns, the returns Determining the share of Trust Fund assets to invest in stocks, and which type of stocks;
how much to invest in bonds, and which type of bonds; and how much to invest in other types of assets, such as real estate and private equity, is a difficult issue. The fundamental objective of any pension trust is to provide the cash the plan needs, when it needs it, to pay promised benefits.
The "gain" the 2001 reform divided between management and labor -like the "gain" management and labor divide in private pension plans -involved investments in equities and taking on risk. So the Trustees, "in accordance with statutory directives," defined as its two "principle objectives: (i) to ensure the timely and certain payments of benefits to eligible railroad retirement plan participants and beneficiaries, and (ii) to achieve a long term rate-of-return on assets sufficient to enhance the financial strength of the Railroad Retirement System." The prudence and diversification RSSIA required could enhance the certainty of benefit payments and reduce other financial risks -but only so far without also reducing expected returns. So setting the Trust's "Investment Guidelines" -its mix of assets and how much and what type of risks to take on -was the fundamental decision the Trustees had to make.
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RSSIA clearly stated that the Trustees "shall … retain independent advisers to assist it in the formulation and adoption of its investment guidelines," which had to be approved by "a unanimous vote of the entire Board of Trustees." 18 The Board retained Watson Wyatt to produce an asset-liability study that recommended the following strategy, which the Trustees unanimously adopted: The guidelines gave the Trustees some flexibility to alter asset allocations in response to market conditions. But they limited the range of deviation. As changes in the price of stocks and bonds shift the value of assets invested in each class, the Trust rebalances on a quarterly basis: It sells assets above their target allocation to provide any additional cash the plan needed to pay benefits, or to buy assets below their allocation target.
The Watson Wyatt guidelines were relatively aggressive. High yield bonds have relatively high expected returns and risk -a financial profile much like equities. So the guidelines allocated 70 percent of Trust Fund assets to investments with high expected returns and risk and 30 percent to investment grade bonds, securities with relatively low expected returns and risk.
International and private equity and high-yield bonds have different risks than domestic equities, the primary risk-asset held by the Trust. So the allocation dampened the expected volatility of Trust Fund returns. The Trustees would add new asset classes, such as overseas bonds, real estate, commodities, "opportunistic" hedge funds, and cash; and also set allocations and performance benchmarks for finer classifications within these asset classes.
As shown in Figure 2 .3, the NRRIT achieved returns that "generally compared favorably" to its benchmarks -indexes used to evaluate the performance of investment managers. But as the Investment returns through the end of fiscal 2011, though below expectations at the beginning of the decade, were nonetheless sufficient to help produce an account benefit ratio of 4.75 times annual outlays for 2012, somewhat above the 4.62 ratio for 2012 projected at the beginning of reform. 20 By this measure, the creation of the NRRIT has thus far proved a success.
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE REFORMED SYSTEM TO DATE
The 2001 reform of the Railroad Retirement program had four elements. It raised benefits, cut taxes, created the NRRIT, and introduced the tax adjustment ratchet to keep the program's finances on-track. The tax cuts, benefit increases, and early retirements financed by the benefit 19 National Railroad Retirement Investment Trust (2008) characterized the allocation as "a structure which is more fully diversified across geography, capitalization size, style, credit quality and many other characteristics" (p1.6) and "addresses asset allocation across a spectrum of active risk levels and degrees of liquidity" (p.17). 20 U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (2003 and 2012) , using employment projection I.
increases (which reduced payroll tax revenues), weakened the system's finances. These effects were expected. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost of these changes at $7 billion over the first 10 years following the enactment of reform. The higher expected returns on Trust Fund assets and the tax adjustment ratchet were designed to see that Railroad Retirement benefits were nonetheless paid (Figure 2.4) . Despite this clear decline in the system's finances since the Crash of 2008, payroll tax rates remained unchanged at 16 percent of covered earnings through 2012. The tax adjustment ratchet adjusts tax rates based on the average account benefit ratio over the preceding 10 years.
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As shown in Figure 2 .7, that average trended down slowly and only crossed the 6.5 threshold at the end of fiscal year 2012, triggering a 6 percent increase in the payroll tax to 17 percent of covered earnings in calendar year 2013. The tax will likely rise another 6 percent, to 18% of covered earnings, in calendar year 2015. Only then, seven years after the Crash of 2008, will the payroll tax return to its benchmark 18 percent rate, for average account benefit ratios within the target band of 4 to 6 times annual benefit outlays.
What strengthened the system during this difficult investment period was the unexpected stability of railroad employment. Rail employment had declined dramatically over the entire post-World War II era, and falling employment is the worst of all possible environments for payas-you-go retirement programs. Under all employment projections, rail employment was projected to continue to fall in the future and the debate in projecting the finances of the program was how steep the fall would be. Despite the significantly enhanced incentive to retire early that the 2001 the reform introduced, which could retire workers that the carriers deemed expendable but would be difficult to dismiss, rail employment remained remarkably strong. By 2010, rail employment was even greater than the optimistic projection of the pre-reform actuarial 21 Rounded UP to the nearest tenth.
valuations (Figure 2.8 ). This stronger than expected employment performance produced unexpectedly strong payroll tax receipts. This helped offset the lackluster performance of the financial markets after the 2008 crash and the delayed response of the ratchet to the program's falling ratio of assets to outlays. 
PROSPECTS GOING FORWARD
The success of the 2001 reform critically depends on how well the program negotiates the "watermelon in the snake" -the wide gap between outlays and tax receipts projected over the next ten to fifteen years. The key variable in the most recent Actuarial Valuation, released in June 2012, is the path of future railroad employment (Figure 2.9) . 22 The most optimistic projection, Assumption I, based on a mild decline in railroad employment, has the account 22 The more optimistic assumptions, assumptions I and II, assume (1) passenger employment will remain level at 45,000 and (2) non-passenger employment will decline at a constant annual rate of 0.5 percent for assumption I and 2.0 percent for assumption II for 25 years, at a reducing rate over the next 25 years, and remain level thereafter. A third and highly pessimistic assumption, widely viewed as highly unlikely, has passenger employment falling 500 workers per year for 20 years, then remain level at 35,000, and non-passenger employment declining 3.5 percent a year for 25 years, at a reducing rate over the next 25 years, and remain level thereafter. 25 th Actuarial Valuation, pp. 8. benefit ratio declining through 2025, to about 3 times annual outlays, then rising quite steadily thereafter (Figure 2.10a) . The intermediate projection, Assumption II, based on a steeper employment decline, has the account benefit ratio declining through 2027, to about 2 times outlays, before rising thereafter at a milder pace (Figure 2.10b) . A third projection, Assumption III, based on steep employment declines widely viewed as highly unlikely, shows a negative balance in 2036 and every year thereafter. The report nonetheless concludes "that, barring a sudden, unanticipated, large drop in railroad employment or substantial investment losses, the railroad retirement system will experience no cash flow problems during the next 23 years." While the carriers should be in a stronger position to bear the downside risk, the tax adjustment ratchet, the mechanism designed to manage risk, is designed to produce a rather sluggish response to shocks. The market Crash of 2008, admittedly a highly unusual event,
illustrates how quickly the program's finances could sour without any tax response. During the post-crash period, the program's finances benefited from unexpectedly strong railroad employment, which reduced the demands on transfers from the Trust. As economic downturns typically reduce both employment levels and asset values, it seems reasonable to expect employment shocks to amplify, not dampen, future financial shocks.
The most recent Actuarial Valuation projects assets under Employment Assumption II hovering at 2 times annual outlays over the last half of the 2020s and not rising above 4 times annual outlays until the early 2060s. Two times annual outlays had been considered a comfortable cushion for the much larger and more stable Social Security program, with assets invested in Treasuries and benefits fully covered by payroll tax receipts. It is not such a comfortable cushion in the far less stable Railroad Retirement program, with a Trust Fund invested in risky assets, while the watermelon is still in the snake. 24 The carrier tax rate under the optimistic employment assumption never rises above the rate they paid before the reform; under the pessimistic assumption, the carrier tax rate rises quickly above the pre-reform rate, but not quickly enough, nor high enough, to prevent insolvency. and created a tax adjustment mechanism to help keep the program's finances on-track. The primary concern of Congress in enacting the reform was the risk of political influence on investment decisions. A secondary concern was the financial performance of the redesigned program.
Railroad Retirement is a government program; its assets are government assets; and the record of government investment of pension fund assets is checkered at best. A leading observer identified a set of "'good practices,' which are not commonly observed in public fund management. These were:
(i) explicit funding targets and mechanisms to trigger action in the case of deviation from this objective; (ii) commercial investment policies flowing from these targets and explicitly aimed at maximizing risk-adjusted returns for members; (iii) professional boards selected through a process that maintains an 'arms-length' relationship with government officials; (iv) prohibition on social investment criteria or ETIs [economically targeted investments]; (v) significant share of investment done through external managers selected and retained by explicit and objective criteria; (vi) avoidance of strict portfolio limits, especially on foreign investments and (vii) high standards of reporting and disclosure including annual, independent audits, performance reviews, and codes of conduct for Board members available to the public."
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By these criteria, the NRRIT is an exemplary manager of public pension assets.
A recent review of the NRRIT governance structure likewise concluded that thus far "the NRRIT appears to have achieved the political independence Congress desired." 26 That review cited five contributing factors: 1) the Trust's legal status as an independent non-government entity; 2) the ERISA-based "mandate" to invest Railroad Retirement assets prudently and solely in the interest of the plan and plan participants; 3) the "professional" character of NRRIT Trustees, who represent both management and labor; 4) the professional development of investment guidelines and benchmarks, primarily carried out by external investment managers;
and 5) an effective system of financial reporting and oversight.
The basic explanation of this success is that all parties -the Congress, the carriers, and the unions -wanted the NRRIT to function like a modern private pension trust. The governance of such trusts has been well-developed under ERISA mandates, and decades of experience, to act as Congress intended -solely to advance the interests of the plan and its participants, using transparent and sophisticated investment management practices.
Of more concern is the financial design of the reformed Railroad Retirement program.
The reformers had far less precedent upon which to build the new design and selected key parameters in a somewhat ad hoc manner. The 4 times annual benefits threshold, below which the ratchet would increase payroll taxes, was set because 4 times annual benefits was the ratio assets to outlays at the time, and historically high in the Railroad Retirement program. The decision to use a 10 year average of that ratio as the basis for setting the tax rate was chosen to dampen shocks on carrier cash flows and reduce the volatility on employee tax rates. The performance of the financial markets in the first decade of reform -admittedly a historically volatile period -illustrates the limits of the ratchet's ability to stabilize the program's finances.
The experience over the next decade and a half, as the watermelon squeezes through the snake, will largely determine whether or not the program's finances might need shoring up. 25 Palacios (2002) 
